Comparisons are a ubiquitous process in information processing. Seven studies examine whether, how, and when comparative thinking increases the efficiency of judgment and choice. Studies 1-4 demonstrate that procedurally priming participants to engage in more vs. less comparison influences how they process information about a target. Specifically, they retrieve less information about the target (Studies 1A, 1B), think more about an information-rich standard (Study 2) about which they activate judgment-relevant information (Study 3), and use this information to compensate for missing target information (Study 4). Studies 2-5 demonstrate the ensuing efficiency advantages. Participants who are primed on comparative thinking are faster in making a target judgment (Studies 2A, 2B, 4, 5) and have more residual processing capacities for a secondary task (Study 5). Studies 6 and 7 establish two boundary conditions by demonstrating that comparative thinking holds efficiency advantages only if target and standard are partly characterized by alignable features (Study 6) that are difficult to evaluate in isolation (Study 7). These findings indicate that comparative thinking may often constitute a useful mechanism to simplify information processing.
The human mind is a remarkable comparison processor. Whenever information is perceived, processed, or evaluated, it seems this information is compared to a salient context, norm, or standard. Even the mere perception of a physical object involves a comparison with a pertinent standard (Helson, 1964) . The perceived size of a target circle, for example, critically depends on whether the target is surrounded by a set of large or small circles, as is evident in the classic Ebbinghaus illusion (Coren & Enns, 1993) . Similarly, the perceived weight of a target object depends on whether it is presented with a set of heavy or light objects (Brown, 1953) . The perception and evaluation of social targets seems equally comparative in nature. The perceived hostility of a target person, for example, critically depends on whether this person is evaluated in comparison to a set of hostile or nonhostile persons (Herr, 1986) . In much the same way, whether we see a given social issue as important (S. J. Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, & Lynn, 1978) , a trial judge as lenient (Higgins & Stangor, 1988) , or ourselves as competent (Morse & Gergen, 1970) all depends on whether the pertinent context consists of a set of high or low comparison standards. The proclivity to engage in comparisons is so much part and parcel of human information processing that even stimuli that are not consciously perceived because they are presented subliminally are compared to a pertinent standard (Dehaene et al., 1998) .
Ubiquity of Comparison
This tendency toward comparative information processing is striking because of its remarkable ubiquity. Psychological research has demonstrated how deeply comparisons pervade our thinking. For one, developmental research shows that comparisons are a fundamental cognitive skill that children already possess at a very early age (Gentner & Medina, 1998; Gentner & Rattermann, 1991) . Basic similarities between objects, for example, can be detected by children as young as 4.5 months (Baillargeon, 1991) . The older children get and the more knowledge they gain, the better they are able to also detect less obvious similarities. Furthermore, research in different areas of psychology shows that comparisons play a key role in areas as diverse as analogy (Gentner & Markman, 1997) , similarity (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993) , categorization (Nosofsky, 1986; Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997) , stereotyping (Biernat, 2003) , attitudes (Sherif & Hovland, 1961) , person perception (Herr, 1986; Higgins & Lurie, 1983; Mussweiler & Damisch, 2008; Smith & Zarate, 1992) , decision making (Choplin & Hummel, 2002; Kahneman & Miller, 1986 ; S. J. Sherman, Houston, & Eddy, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) , affect (Higgins, 1987) , and the self (Festinger, 1954; Higgins, Strauman, & Klein, 1986; Miller & Prentice, 1996) . Comparisons are engaged even if they are not explicitly requested. In fact, it has been suggested that when stimuli of all levels of complexity are processed, they are spontaneously compared to the norms and standards they evoke (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) . When processing information about another person, for example, people spontaneously compare this person to themselves (Dunning & Hayes, 1996) . Similarly, when processing information about themselves, people spontaneously compare themselves to others (Festinger, 1954; Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003) . Recent evidence suggests that this tendency to make spontaneous comparisons when processing information about a given target is so strong that people even use comparison standards that-phenomenologically-are not even present, because they were presented subliminally (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004a) .
In addition, the propensity for comparative processing is so robust that comparisons are even engaged with standards thatfrom a normative perspective-are unlikely to provide useful information about the target. In one study demonstrating this robustness (Gilbert, Giesler, & Morris, 1995) , participants compared their own performance in a task to a salient other's even when this person clearly constituted an inappropriate standard because he had received additional training in the critical ability. 1 Further, abundant research has demonstrated that on the level of simple judgments people even use standards that are clearly irrelevant because they were selected at random. The most prominent example for this use of random comparison standards is given by Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) seminal study on judgmental anchoring-a phenomenon that captures how comparing a target to a numeric standard (e.g., 65%) influences subsequent estimates of the target. In this classic study, participants estimated the percentage of African nations in the United Nations. Before doing so, they considered a comparison standard that was randomly determined by spinning a wheel of fortune. This random selection made it clear to participants that the standards did not provide useful information about the critical target. Still, participants used these standards as a basis for their judgments. In fact, even judges who are experienced experts in the critical domain are influenced by such randomly determined comparison standards-even when the judges themselves readily evaluate these standards as irrelevant (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006) . Why is this tendency to process information in a comparative manner so ubiquitous? Why do people compare?
Efficiency of Comparative Thinking
We speculate that one reason for this ubiquity is the efficiency of comparative information processing. People are often overwhelmed by the abundance of cognitive tasks they have to master, so they frequently behave as cognitive misers (Taylor, 1981) . Consistent with this principle, abundant research shows that people have a strong tendency to rely on those information processing strategies that are particularly efficient. For example, people typically rely on the use of categories in general (Bruner, 1957) and stereotypes in particular (Bodenhausen, 1990; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994) because doing so saves cognitive capacities. Similarly, people rely on heuristics that transform complex tasks into simple judgments because doing so saves scarce processing resources (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) . In much the same way, we would like to suggest that people as cognitive misers may rely on comparisons because doing so simplifies information processing and frees scarce cognitive resources for competing tasks. Why may this be the case? Which psychological mechanisms may contribute to the proposed efficiency advantages of comparative thinking?
To answer this question, it is important to take a closer look at the psychological mechanisms that underlie comparative thinking.
Any comparison requires the psychological presence of a comparison standard, so that standard activation is a natural starting point for the analysis of comparison mechanisms (Biernat & Eidelman, 2007; Mussweiler, 2003) . Recent research demonstrates that when evaluating a given target, judges spontaneously activate standards about which they have abundant information available and that they have frequently used as standards in the past-so-called routine standards (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003; Rüter & Mussweiler, 2005) . When asked to evaluate their own cheerfulness, for example, college student participants spontaneously activated information about the cheerfulness of their best friend-probably the standard about which students have the most information (Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003) . Similarly, when asked to evaluate the punctuality of another person, participants spontaneously activated information about the punctuality of themselves-clearly the standard about which they have the most information (Dunning & Hayes, 1996) . It is notable that this activation of information about the self is not limited to specific information that pertains directly to the evaluated characteristic but also includes more general self information, such as one's gender (Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002) . This suggests that a rather encompassing standard representation is spontaneously activated (see also Mussweiler & Rüter, 2003) . This research demonstrates that comparative thinking typically involves the spontaneous activation of information-rich standards for which participants have ample judgment-relevant information available.
The activation of such information-rich comparison standards suggests a first way in which comparative thinking may hold an efficiency advantage. If comparative thinking involves the activation of a standard for which judges have ample judgment-relevant information available, then they may use this standard information as a proxy for target information that is unavailable or difficult to obtain. This notion is in line with the suggestion by Medin et al. (1993, p. 259 ) that "accessed information for one concept will tend to be carried over and tested for applicability to the other concept." In this way, comparisons may allow judges to partially forgo the search for some pieces of target information altogether. Instead of retrieving all the information about a target that is required, judges may simply rely on readily available information about the standard. When making judgments about the reactions of another person (Ross, Green, & House, 1977 ; for an overview, see Krueger, 1998 Krueger, , 2007 , for example, one may rely on readily available information about one's own reactions as a judgmental basis. Using this readily available information about the self is likely to require fewer cognitive capacities than searching for, weighing, and integrating relevant information about the target person. In this way, information about a pertinent standard may be used to fill in for information that is more difficult to obtain about the judgmental target (Medin et al., 1993) . Doing so is likely to 1 Under specific conditions, however, a comparison standard may have no influence. If a potential comparison standard is not perceived as being related to a novel situation or even experienced as a distraction from the main task, for example, it might have no effect on an individual's performance in that novel situation. Research on analogical problem solving found intriguing evidence for the nonconsideration of potential comparison standards when participants simply did not make a connection between a described problem and a problem they have to solve (Gick & Holyoak, 1980) . simplify the critical task in important ways, particularly if relevant information about the target is difficult to obtain.
Once comparison standards are activated, they are compared to the judgmental target. Prominent conceptualizations emphasize that such comparisons are carried out along relational structures between the individual attributes of the target and the standard (Gentner & Markman, 1994 Markman & Gentner, 1993 , 1996 Medin et al., 1993) . The basic assumption of these structuremapping approaches to comparison is that in comparing two objects, people are influenced not merely by sets of separate properties but also by how the properties are interrelated within the standard and the target. Judges first determine a general relational structure among individual properties that is shared by the target and the standard and then primarily base their comparison on properties that are related to the shared or alignable relational structure. That is, the comparison focuses primarily on alignable features, whereas nonalignable features are ignored. This perspective on comparison is supported by a host of empirical findings (for an overview, see Gentner & Markman, 1997) . For one, judges typically consider facts that are related to the shared alignable structure to be more central to the comparison than facts that are not related to this structure (e.g., Clement & Gentner, 1991) . Thus commonalities related to the alignable structure are more salient than those that are unrelated. The same appears to be true for differences (Gentner & Markman, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1996) . When asked to list differences between a target and a standard, people tend to list alignable differences-differences related to the common structure rather than nonalignable (unrelated) differences. Similarly, comparisons of consumer products are often primarily based on alignable differences whereas nonalignable differences are ignored (Zhang & Markman, 2001) . Within the domain of social judgment there is abundant evidence demonstrating that significant others are used as standards to evaluate strangers who share at least some commonalities (i.e., are alignable) with the significant other (see Andersen & Chen, 2002 , for a review). These theoretical considerations and empirical findings hold that comparative thinking involves a focus on a subset of potentially relevant information. When comparing a target to an activated standard, judges selectively focus on those target features that are related to an alignable structure and effectively ignore those target features that are unrelated to this common structure. This informational focus on alignable features suggests a second way in which comparative thinking may hold efficiency advantages. Considering only a subset of potentially judgment-relevant target information is likely to require less processing capacities than considering a more encompassing set of information.
Taken together, this reasoning implies that comparative thinking involves information focus in that it allows judges to focus on a subset of potentially judgment-relevant information about the judgmental target. Comparative thinking also involves information transfer. Comparison is likely to involve the spontaneous activation of an information-rich comparison standard, so that available standard information may be used as a proxy for target information that is unavailable or difficult to obtain. In combination, these mechanisms of information focus and information transfer are likely to entail efficiency advantages for comparative thinking.
Accuracy of Comparative Thinking
Do these assumed efficiency advantages come at the cost of accuracy? Does the focus on a subset of relevant target information and the transfer of easily accessible standard information lead to less accurate judgments? Not necessarily. In fact, it seems that both mechanisms-information focus and information transferwill often lead to judgmental outcomes that are comparable to those of a less comparative and potentially more elaborate judgment process.
To see this, let us first consider how information focus influences judgment accuracy. In line with our assumption that information focus does not necessarily lead to less accurate judgments, previous research has demonstrated that time pressure-a factor influencing how much judgment-relevant information is considered-does not necessarily influence the judgment per se. Specifically, putting participants under time pressure while they compare an unknown quantity to a given numeric standard influenced only the time participants needed to generate a subsequent estimate, not the nature of this estimate (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b) . For example, participants who were asked whether the German river Elbe is longer or shorter than 890 km subsequently made similar estimates of its actual length no matter whether they were given only 5 s or ample time to make the comparison. This may be the case because the judgment per se is not primarily a function of the amount of information on which it is based, but of the implications of this information. To the extent that the information generated during the first 5 s has similar implications for the length of the Elbe as the information generated afterward, similar estimates should result. In much the same way, the information focus that comparative thinking appears to entail may not necessarily lead to less accurate judgments.
The same seems to be the case for information transfer. Whether using available information about the comparison standard as a proxy for unavailable information about the judgmental target influences the accuracy of judgment is primarily a function of target-standard similarity. If target and standard are highly similar, then information transfer is unlikely to impede accuracy, because the transferred standard information and the missing target information are likely to have similar implications. Target-standard similarity is one of the main guiding principles of standard activation (Festinger, 1954; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) in that judges typically activate standards that are similar to the judgmental target. To the extent that this principle is in place, information transfer will often not influence the outcome of a judgment process per se.
To be sure, it seems clear that information focus and information transfer can both in principle reduce judgment accuracy. To the extent that important accuracy-enhancing information is ignored or distorting information is introduced, comparative thinking may lead to less accurate judgments (Choplin & Hummel, 2005) . The above reasoning, however, suggests that this does not necessarily have to be, and may often not be, the case. We investigated how comparative thinking influences judgment accuracy in the context of the present research. To do so, we examined whether the judgment outcome depends on the extent to which judges engage in comparative thinking. For many human judgments-particularly those that are complex and rely on information with ambiguous implications-objective true values are difficult to obtain (for a discussion, see e.g., Kruglanski, 1989) . No matter which criterion for accuracy (Kruglanski, 1989; Swann, 1984) is used, however, differences in judgment accuracy presuppose differences in judgment outcomes. In this respect, examining whether judgment outcomes depend on the extent of comparative thinking allows us to indirectly explore judgment accuracy in situations in which true values do not exist.
Boundary Conditions
Our reasoning thus far implies that comparative thinking invariably holds efficiency advantages. It is important to note, however, that the above analysis also suggests a first boundary condition for these efficiency advantages to occur. On the basis of a structural alignment perspective on comparison (Gentner & Markman, 1994 Markman & Gentner, 1993 , 1996 Medin et al., 1993) , we have hypothesized that comparisons are carried out along a shared relational structure among individual features of target and standard. If comparison requires such an alignable structure, then comparative thinking may be hard to engage and may consequently lose its efficiency advantages in situations in which an alignable structure is difficult or impossible to establish. This suggests that comparative thinking will primarily show efficiency advantages when the features of target and standard are alignable rather than nonalignable. In the present research, we examined how this first potential boundary condition influences the assumed efficiency advantages of comparative thinking.
A second potential boundary condition is suggested by Hsee's (1996) research on the differential evaluability of attributes. This author has suggested that stimulus attributes differ in the extent to which they can be evaluated in relative isolation. For example, evaluating whether a monthly rent of €500 is a lot or a little for an apartment in the city of Cologne is difficult when this amount is considered in isolation. The same task becomes considerably easier, however, when the target rent is compared to standard rents of similar apartments. Comparative thinking may be particularly efficient in situations in which a given attribute is difficult to evaluate separately, because its implications become apparent only when considered within the whole range of values (Hsee, 1996) . The present research also examined how evaluability as a second boundary condition influences the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking.
The Present Research
The present research was designed to examine the existence, mechanisms, and boundary conditions of the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. In these studies, we applied a procedural priming logic (Smith, 1994) to manipulate the extent to which judges rely on comparisons when processing target information. Participants' main task was to judge an unknown target. Prior to the critical judgment task, participants worked on an ostensibly unrelated task that was solved using a more or less comparative processing style. Previous research suggests that such different processing modes will carry over to the subsequent target judgments (Mussweiler, 2001 ; for an overview see Smith, 1994) . This procedural link between the priming and the target task allows us to examine the efficiency advantages of comparative information processing by manipulating the extent to which judges engage in comparison. In light of the described ubiquity of comparative information processing, it seems difficult to create situations in which judges do not engage comparisons at all. As a consequence, one can influence only whether comparisons are engaged to a greater or lesser extent. A procedural priming approach is an apt way to manipulate this extent of comparative information processing.
Studies 1-4 examine how comparative thinking changes information processing during a judgment task. Our reasoning suggests that comparative thinking changes how judges process information in three major ways. Specifically, we contend that judges who engage in more comparative thinking (a) focus on a subset of, and limit their search for, judgment-relevant target knowledge, (b) activate information about a judgmental standard, and (c) use available standard knowledge as a proxy for target knowledge that is unavailable. Studies 1A and 1B examine how procedurally priming comparative thinking changes the way in which judges seek information about the judgmental target. In particular, we examine whether after comparison priming participants partly forgo the search for target knowledge and thus search for and activate less target knowledge than do control participants. Studies 2A and 3 examine whether judges who are primed on comparative processing think more about a pertinent standard and activate more judgment-relevant information about it than do control participants. Study 4 examines whether activated standard information is ascribed to the judgmental target.
Studies 2A, 2B, 4, and 5 examine the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking more directly with the help of two distinct measures. In all four studies, we examine whether participants who engage in more comparative processing are faster in making the critical judgments. Furthermore, in Study 5, we use a dual-task paradigm to examine whether participants who engage more strongly in comparative processing require less cognitive resources for the primary judgment task and have more capacities available for a secondary task.
The remaining two studies, Studies 6 and 7, examine two potential boundary conditions for the proposed efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. Specifically, Study 6 examines whether participants who are procedurally primed on comparative thinking are faster in making target judgments only in situations in which target and standard share an alignable structure that is easily apparent. Study 7 focuses on evaluability as a second potential boundary condition. Specifically, we examine whether the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are apparent primarily for comparisons of attributes that are difficult to evaluate in isolation (low evaluability).
Study 1
Our first study examined whether comparative thinking indeed changes information processing in a fundamental way. We have suggested that comparative information processing may allow judges to limit the extent to which they engage in the time-and capacity-consuming process of searching for relevant target information. Because the use of comparisons provides judges with information about a pertinent standard, they can use this readily available information about the standard as a proxy for missing information about the target. This implies that comparative processing leads to a more limited search for new information when judging a novel target. Study 1 focuses on one central aspect of this hypothesized change in information processing by comparative thinking. Specifically, we examine whether judges who rely more heavily on comparative thinking do indeed search for and activate less information about the judgmental target. To investigate this possibility, we developed a paradigm that allowed us to count the pieces of information participants retrieve. We hypothesized that comparative information processing would lead to a reduced search for information about a target.
To examine this possibility, we asked participants to evaluate a target apartment about which they were given a rich database. Participants' task was to evaluate the apartment along a number of different dimensions. For each of these dimensions, participants could retrieve background information from the provided database that allowed them to make a more informed judgment. If comparative processing indeed allows judges to make the critical target judgment on the basis of less information about the target, then participants who were procedurally primed on comparative processing should retrieve less background information about the target from the database.
We examined this possibility in Studies 1A and 1B. In both studies, we procedurally primed participants to rely more or less heavily on comparative processing before searching for information and evaluating the target apartment. Studies 1A and 1B used different materials for the procedural priming of more versus less comparative processing styles. Other than that, procedures were equivalent.
Study 1A

Method
Participants. Forty-seven students were recruited as participants. They were contacted over the phone and asked to participate in a series of unrelated studies that would last for a total of about 1 hr. As compensation, participants were offered €6 (about U.S. $7.50 at the time).
Procedure. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were led to individual cubicles and seated in front of a personal computer. No more than 3 individuals participated in one session. The experimenter told participants that they would work on a couple of short, unrelated studies exploring human information processing. They first worked on a paper-and-pencil procedural priming task. All participants were given sketches of two scenes that were taken from Markman and Gentner (1996) ; one depicted a woman leaning over a table while holding a cup of coffee, and the other depicted a man standing in front of a table while reaching for a bowl. For a first group of our participants (n ϭ 21), the two sketches were presented on the same page. These participants were explicitly instructed to compare the two pictures and to write down similarities and differences between them (comparative processing condition). For a second group of our participants (n ϭ 26), the two sketches were depicted on two separate pages. These participants were asked to describe each of the individual scenes separately (control condition).
Upon completion of the priming task, participants proceeded with the critical judgment task, which was administered on the computer. Instructions explained that participants were about to take part in a study of Internet advertisements. We explained that although searching for an apartment via the Internet has become increasingly common in our society, relatively little is known about which facts are important to get an impression of the apartment. We further informed participants that their task was to judge a fictitious apartment on several dimensions. Thus, they may, for example, be asked to judge the size of the apartment. To be in a position to make such a judgment, they would receive background information for each of the judgments they were asked to make about the apartment. Participants were instructed to retrieve as much information as they deemed necessary to make a judgment.
Participants judged the target apartment along three critical dimensions. Specifically, they estimated the price of rent, the price of utilities, and the distance to the university. Each of these judgments was presented on a separate computer screen along with a different set of cues representing the available background information for the given judgment. A total of 28 cues, 8 to 10 for each of the judgmental dimensions, were given. These cues were presented as labeled buttons on the computer screen. The buttons were vaguely labeled to give participants an idea of what kind of information they represented. For example, for the judgment about the rent for the apartment, the available cues included the number of bedrooms, the type of building, and the number of bathrooms. Participants could choose to see the full background information that corresponded to each cue by clicking the respective button on the screen. To illustrate, for the critical judgment about the rent, participants were provided with 10 cues. For one of them the corresponding button was labeled rooms. Upon clicking on that button it was revealed that the apartment had four rooms. Participants could inspect this information as long as they liked and could then return to the computer screen with the critical judgment and the list of available cues. Participants could freely choose how many cues they wanted to select, and thus how much background information about the target apartment they received. To provide their answer, participants pressed an answer button that was presented on the same screen as the critical judgment and the available cues. They could then provide their answer on the next screen. Upon doing so, they proceeded with the next judgment, which was presented on the subsequent screen together with a new set of cues.
Results
We hypothesized that participants who were primed on a more comparative processing style would search for less information about the judgmental target than those who were primed on a less comparative processing style (control). To examine this possibility, we summed up the number of cues participants selected across the three judgments to retrieve background information about the target. Consistent with our prediction, participants in a more comparative processing mode retrieved less background information about the target judgment (M ϭ 13.05, SD ϭ 1.35) than did control participants (M ϭ 17.11, SD ϭ 1.09), t(45) ϭ 2.37, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.66.
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Study 1B
Method
Participants. Thirty-nine students of various majors at the University of Cologne participated in the study. They received a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials and procedure. Upon arrival in the lab participants were greeted by the experimenter and seated in separate cubicles. They were told that they would participate in two separate tasks that were completely unrelated. The first task (i.e., the procedural priming) was introduced as a pretest to validate material for a study on perception. To elicit a comparative information processing style a first group of the participants (n ϭ 19) was asked to compare two parts of one large picture. The picture showed a color painting of a jungle scene with a large number of different animals (e.g., a monkey, a squirrel, a duck) and plants (e.g., various trees, colorful flowers).
3 In the middle of the picture was a vertical line dividing the picture into two equally sized parts. Participants were told to compare the two halves and write down all similarities and differences between them they could find. In the control condition (n ϭ 20), participants received the same picture, but without the line. They were asked to describe the picture. This part of the experiment was a paper-and-pencil task.
Upon completion of the priming task, participants proceeded with the critical judgment task, in which they were again asked to judge a target apartment. This task was similar to the one used in Study 1A. Participants judged the apartment along five dimensions, namely, the overall size of the apartment, the size of the room that is for rent, the price of the rent, the price of utilities, and the distance to the university. A total of 44 cues were presented.
4
For example, the cues for the price of the apartment included the total number of rooms (i.e., four) and the fact that the apartment is located in an older building (i.e., indicating an attractive and somewhat larger apartment), among others. The cues for the distance to the university were specific time estimates regarding how long it would take to reach the university by using the tram system, riding a bike, driving by car, or walking to the main campus area. Judgments and cues were presented and answers were given in the same way as in Study 1A.
Results
We expected participants who were primed on a more comparative processing style to retrieve less information about the apartment than participants in the control condition. Therefore we calculated the sum of all retrieved cues per participant, which served as our dependent variable. The results confirmed our expectation. Participants who were primed on a more comparative information processing style searched for significantly less information about the apartment (M ϭ 26.79, SD ϭ 7.69) than did participants in the control condition (M ϭ 31.30, SD ϭ 6.31), t(37) ϭ 2.01, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.64.
Discussion
The results of Studies 1A and 1B suggest that comparative processing indeed limits the amount of target information that participants search for before making the critical judgment. Participants who were procedurally primed to engage in a more comparative mode of information processing viewed fewer pieces of information about the target apartment than did control participants.
Study 2
Our reasoning holds that judges who were primed to rely more heavily on comparative thinking are in a position to limit the search for target knowledge as is apparent from Study 1, because comparative thinking induces them to think more about an information-rich comparison standard. Study 2 was designed to examine this possibility. If comparative processing indeed induces judges to think more about a pertinent comparison standard, then this standard should be more accessible subsequent to the judgment task. We used a lexical decision task to see whether this is indeed the case. Participants judged an unknown target City X for which their hometown Würzburg constituted an information-rich comparison standard. If participants who were primed with comparative processing think more about this standard while judging City X, as we contend, then they should be faster than control participants in recognizing Würzburg in a lexical decision task.
Limiting the search for target information in the way demonstrated in Study 1 is likely to render comparative information processing more efficient. Because searching for, evaluating, and weighing target knowledge is an arduous task that draws on cognitive processing capacities, the less target information participants search for, the faster they should be in judging the target. Study 2 was also designed to demonstrate that comparative processing may allow judges to make target judgments more quickly.
Study 2A was designed with two goals in mind: (a) to examine whether more comparative thinking indeed leads to increased accessibility of standard information and (b) to demonstrate for the first time that more comparative thinking indeed allows judges to make the critical judgments faster. Study 2B then focuses on the latter efficiency advantage of comparison by attempting to replicate the expected finding with a different method to induce comparative thinking.
Study 2A
Participants were asked to form an impression of an unknown City X and to subsequently make a series of judgments about it. City X was briefly described in a short paragraph in terms that made it generally comparable to participants' home city of Würz-burg. Whereas City X was generally comparable to Würzburg, we also made it clear that it was not identical to Würzburg by stating that City X is located in a different federal state of Germany. In this paradigm, participants' hometown constitutes an informationrich comparison standard so that participants could arrive at their judgments about City X by comparing it to Würzburg. To manipulate the extent to which participants relied on comparison, we again used a procedural priming task. We asked participants either to compare two pictures in writing or to describe these pictures separately. If comparative processing holds efficiency advantages-as we contend-then participants who were primed on more comparative processing should be faster in judging City X.
Furthermore, if comparative processing induces judges to think more about the information-rich comparison standard, this standard should become more accessible. This, in turn, would be apparent if participants were faster in recognizing the standard in a lexical decision task (Neely, 1977) . To examine this possibility, we asked participants to make a series of lexical decisions after they had judged target City X. One of the stimuli used in this lexical decision task was the name of the pertinent comparison standard, the city of Würzburg. If participants who were primed on more comparative processing do indeed think more about Würz-burg when judging City X, then this should be apparent in shorter response latencies for the word Würzburg.
Method
Participants. Thirty-nine students at the University of Würz-burg were recruited as participants. They were approached in the university cafeteria and asked whether they were willing to participate in a psychological experiment in exchange for a chocolate bar.
Procedure. Participants were led to a separate room and seated in separate cubicles. The experimenter explained that they would work on several short experiments that were unrelated to one another. They first worked on the paper-and-pencil-based procedural priming task used in Study 1A.
After completion of the priming task, participants were each seated in front of a laptop computer to work on the ostensibly unrelated critical judgment task. Instructions pointed out that participants' task was to form an impression of an unknown City X and to subsequently make a series of judgments about it. City X was then briefly described in a short paragraph in terms that made it generally comparable to participants' home city of Würzburg. In particular, City X was said to be a university town that was also a center of German Catholicism. In addition it was pointed out that the city was famous for its vineyards and its scenic location at the banks of a large river. Although this information made City X generally comparable to Würzburg, we also made it clear that it was not identical to Würzburg by stating that it is located in a different federal state. After participants had read the short paragraph and had reflected on it for an additional 30 s, they proceeded to judge the target along a total of five dimensions. These dimensions pertained to the number of inhabitants, students, movie theaters, major bridges, and street car lines. Participants were instructed to make these judgments as quickly and as accurately as possible. Each of the target questions was presented on a separate screen. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as soon as they had come up with an answer. Instructions emphasized that participants should not press the spacebar before they actually knew their answer. After pressing the spacebar to indicate that they had come up with an answer, a response field appeared on the screen and participants were instructed to enter their answer into this response field. The critical response latencies were recorded from the moment the question appeared on the screen until participants pressed the spacebar to indicate that they were ready to give an answer.
After completion of this judgment task, participants proceeded with the lexical decision task, which was described as a test of participants' verbal abilities. Specifically, participants were told that they would be presented with a series of letter strings and would be asked to indicate whether each constituted a word of the German language. To indicate that the presented letter string was a word, participants were instructed to press the right control button (marked with a red dot). To indicate that the presented letter string was a nonword, they were instructed to press the left control button (marked with a green dot). Participants were informed that it was essential for this task to make decisions as accurately and as quickly as possible. To allow them to do so, they were further instructed to put their index fingers on the respective response keys and to keep this position throughout the task. Each letter string was presented in the center of the screen until participants had indicated their response. Each lexical decision was followed by a break of 1,000 ms before the next letter string was presented. This sequence was repeated for each of the 15 letter strings. Ten of these were German words (e.g., Murmel [marble] or Rahmen [frame]) and 5 were nonwords (e.g., polibalf or legabip). The first 10 lexical decision trials served as practice trials, which were included to help participants adapt to the task. Items 11-15 were the critical ones that included the target word, a nonword, and three neutral words. The name of the pertinent standard Würzburg, which served as our target word, was presented at the 13th position in the sequence. The neutral words were presented at the 11th, 14th, and 15th positions in the sequence. All items were presented in a fixed order that had been randomly determined.
After completion of the lexical decision task, participants were thanked, thoroughly debriefed, and given their candy.
Results
Target judgments. We expected participants who were primed on a more comparative processing mode to be faster in making the critical target judgments than participants who were primed on a less comparative processing mode. To examine this possibility, we analyzed the mean response latencies to the critical judgments about target City X (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .79). To control for outliers, for each response dimension we excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the mean (6.5% of all responses; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and averaged them into one index. Indeed, participants in a more comparative processing mode were faster in evaluating the target City X (M ϭ 8,494 ms, SD ϭ 595) than control participants (M ϭ 12,299 ms, SD ϭ 1,248), t(37) ϭ 3.01, p ϭ .01, d ϭ 0.91.
We also examined whether participants in both conditions judged target City X differently. Because the critical estimates allow for almost unrestrained variance, we first excluded all estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 SDs. We then z-transformed the individual judgments and averaged them into one index. Participants' judgments of target City X did not significantly depend on whether they were primed on comparative processing (M ϭ Ϫ0.11, SD ϭ 0.72) or not (M ϭ 0.14, SD ϭ 0.45), t(37) ϭ 1.12, ns.
Lexical decisions. We hypothesized that participants who were primed on a more comparative processing mode would rely more heavily on information about the pertinent standard Würz-burg when judging target City X. If this is indeed the case, then after the target judgment, Würzburg should be more accessible for participants who were primed with a more comparative processing mode. As a consequence, we expected response latencies for lexical decisions about the target word Würzburg to be shorter for participants who were primed to engage in more comparative processing.
We excluded response latencies that differed by more than 2 SDs from the mean (5.8% of all responses) from our analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . Outliers were distributed across conditions. Among them were the latencies for three responses to the target word Würzburg, so the analysis of the lexical decisions is based on the responses of 36 participants.
The means depicted in Figure 1 are consistent with our reasoning. Those participants who had been induced to process the target judgments in a more comparative manner were indeed faster in identifying the target word Würzburg (M ϭ 688 ms, SD ϭ 161) than control participants (M ϭ 811 ms, SD ϭ 175), t(34) ϭ 2.16, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.74. In contrast, no difference emerged in response latencies to the neutral words (M ϭ 638 ms, SD ϭ 126 vs. M ϭ 638 ms, SD ϭ 116; t Ͻ 1). In a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (target word vs. neutral words) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), this pattern was borne out in a significant interaction effect, F(1, 34) ϭ 8.88, p ϭ .01, partial 2 ϭ .21. In this analysis the main effect of word type also reached significance, F(1, 34) ϭ 29.60, p ϭ .001, partial 2 ϭ .47, indicating that participants were faster in responding to the neutral words than to the target word. The main effect of priming failed to reach significance, F(1, 34) ϭ 1.91, ns.
Study 2B
We designed Study 2B to replicate the efficiency advantages of comparative processing demonstrated for the first time in Study 2A, using a different task to induce differential levels of comparative processing. We again used a procedural priming logic to induce a more versus less comparative processing style, this time with a different and more indirect priming task. Prior to the critical judgment task, participants worked on an unrelated priming task in which they had to find eight errors in a drawing of a circus scene. For participants in the comparative processing condition, this priming was a comparative error search that took the form of an original and copy task. Specifically, these participants were provided with two cartoons of the same scene-an "original" and a "copy"-that differed with respect to eight details. The cartoon depicted a circus scene with clowns, tightrope artists, spectators, and animal tamers. Participants' task was to identify the eight details with respect to where the original and the copy differed. To solve this task, participants thus had to repeatedly compare the two pictures. For participants in the control condition, however, the priming was an absolute error search. These participants were provided only with the original cartoon of the circus scene and were instructed to identify eight details that constituted logical inconsistencies (e.g., raindrops underneath an umbrella). To solve this task, participants did not have to engage in comparative processing. If our reasoning is correct, then participants who solve the priming task by repeatedly comparing the two pictures should rely more heavily on comparisons in the target task, which should in turn allow them to complete the target task more quickly.
Method
Participants. Forty students participated in the experiment. They were approached in the university cafeteria and asked to participate in a brief series of psychological studies. Participants were offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Procedure. Upon agreement to take part in the study, participants were led to a separate room, greeted by the experimenter, and seated in separate cubicles. The experimenter explained that the participants' task was to work on several short experiments that were unrelated to one another and were administered together solely for efficiency reasons. They first worked on a paper-andpencil procedural priming task. A first group of our participants (n ϭ 20) was in the comparative processing condition. They were given two very detailed sketches depicting the same circus scene. One picture was labeled as the original the other as the copy. Participants were instructed to closely examine the two scenes and to identify eight details ("errors") that distinguished the copy from the original. These details had to be circled in the copy. The second group of our participants (n ϭ 20) was in the control condition and received just one picture (namely, the original from the comparative processing condition). These participants were instructed to find eight logical mistakes (e.g., raindrops underneath an umbrella) and circle them. These logical mistakes were the same details that distinguished the copy from the original in the comparative processing condition.
After completion of the priming task, participants were each seated in front of a laptop computer to work on the "unrelated" critical judgment task, which was identical to the one used in Study 2A. Thus, participants again formed an impression of target City X and subsequently made a series of judgments about it. After completion of the judgment task, participants were thanked, thoroughly debriefed, and offered a bar of chocolate. 
Results
We excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the mean (6.1% of all responses) from further analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . Furthermore, we averaged participants' response latencies to the five critical target questions into one index of processing speed.
If comparative information processing does indeed hold the assumed efficiency advantages, then participants in the comparative processing condition should be faster in making the critical target judgments than participants in the absolute processing condition. We analyzed participants' mean response latencies for the evaluation of the target City X (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .69) to examine this possibility. Indeed, participants who processed the critical judgments in a more comparative manner were faster in judging target City X (M ϭ 6,974 ms, SD ϭ 503) than control participants (M ϭ 9,437 ms, SD ϭ 884), t(38) ϭ 2.42, p ϭ .01, d ϭ 0.77.
Again, we examined whether participants in both conditions judged target City X differently. To do so, we excluded estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 SDs, z-transformed the individual judgments, and averaged them into one index. Participants' judgments of target City X did not depend on whether they were primed on comparative processing (M ϭ Ϫ0.15, SD ϭ 0.40) or not (M ϭ 0.15, SD ϭ 0.62), t(38) ϭ 1.80, ns.
Discussion
The results of Studies 2A and 2B have at least three important implications. First, the findings of Study 2A further specify how comparison changes information processing in a way that may allow for efficiency advantages. Study 1 demonstrated that comparative information processing limits the amount of information judges activate about the judgmental target. Study 2A supplements this finding by hinting at the process that may have allowed participants in a comparative processing mode to partly forgo activating target knowledge. Specifically, the fact that experimental participants recognized Würzburg more quickly in a lexical decision task suggests that they had more extensively thought about and used information about this pertinent standard than had control participants. Comparison may thus allow judges to limit the search for judgment-relevant target knowledge by inducing them to focus more on readily available standard knowledge.
Second, the findings of Studies 2A and 2B demonstrate that participants who were primed on more comparative processing were able to make the critical judgments faster than control participants. The findings of Study 2A provide initial support for the notion that comparative information processing indeed has efficiency advantages, in that the use of comparisons may speed up the judgment process. The findings of Study 2B provide further support for this idea. Again, participants who were procedurally primed to rely more heavily on comparisons when processing the critical target judgments were able to make these judgments faster than control participants. This replication of the efficiency advantage initially demonstrated in Study 2A was obtained using a different priming method that induced the alternative processing styles in a more indirect way and thus emphasizes the generalizability of the obtained facilitation effect.
Third, the present results do not provide any indication that these efficiency advantages of comparative thinking come at the cost of judgment accuracy. In light of the fact that target judgments pertained to a fictitious city, of course, the accuracy of these judgments cannot be assessed. Differences in accuracy, however, presuppose that target judgments by the experimental and the control groups differ. This does not appear to be the case.
Study 3
Study 2A provides initial evidence suggesting that comparative processing induces judges to think more about an information-rich comparison standard. This is apparent in the fact that judges recognized the name of the standard more quickly in a lexical decision task. Our reasoning, however, holds not only that judges think about a pertinent standard but also that they activate judgment-relevant information about it. This activated standard information can then be used as a proxy for target information that is not readily available. In this respect, the spontaneous activation of standard information may contribute to the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. We designed Study 3 to provide additional support for the spontaneous activation of standard information in the realm of person judgment. Previous research has demonstrated that when judging others, people often use themselves as a comparison standard and spontaneously activate information about their own standing on the judgmental dimension (e.g., Dunning & Hayes, 1996; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002) . When judging how punctual another person is, for example, people spontaneously activate information about their own punctuality (Dunning & Hayes, 1996) . The present analysis holds that the more participants engage in comparative thinking, the more information about the judgmental standard should be activated.
Study 3 was designed to examine this possibility. To do so, we asked our participants to form an impression of and make a judgment about a briefly described target person. Specifically, participants first formed an impression about a person who was described as engaging in a number of tasks that are related to manual skills (e.g., repairing a bike). Participants then judged how manually skilled this target is. Previous research (Dunning & Hayes, 1996) suggests that the self is used as a standard in making these judgments. Subsequently, participants were asked to either describe an aspect that is directly related to the self as the pertinent standard of the preceding judgment (e.g., a manual skill that they themselves possess) or unrelated to this standard (e.g., an advantage of having manual skills). If our reasoning is correct, then the more participants engage in comparative thinking, the more they should spontaneously activate information about their own manual skills while judging the target person. As a consequence, participants who had been procedurally primed to engage in comparative thinking should be faster in describing one of their own manual skills. Notably, this speed-up should be apparent only for descriptions that rely on information that is related to the comparison standard (i.e., the self). Standard-unrelated information (e.g., advantages of having manual skills) should be equally accessible for participants who were primed to engage more heavily in comparative thinking and control participants, so the descriptions that rely on standard-unrelated information should be given equally fast by both groups.
Method
Participants. We recruited 65 undergraduates at the University of Cologne as participants. They were approached in a university cafeteria, asked to participate in a series of unrelated psychological studies, and offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials and procedure. On arrival in the lab, participants were greeted by the experimenter and led to a cubicle that was equipped with a personal computer. Participants were informed that they would work on a series of unrelated studies that were administered together solely to save scarce research resources.
The materials and procedures used in Study 3 were similar to those employed by Mussweiler and Bodenhausen (2002) . The experimenter first explained that because the second study involved a somewhat complex experimental procedure, he would explain it to the participants beforehand. The experimenter then proceeded to explain that the second study consisted of a series of trials with three different tasks each. For each trial, participants would first be exposed to the description of a target person and would be asked to form an impression of this person (impression formation task). Once they had formed an impression, they would then be instructed to judge this person on a dimension that is related to the information provided (judgment task). To do so, they should first form their judgment in their mind and press the spacebar once they had done so. The judgment should then be entered on the next computer screen (for a similar procedure, see J. W. Sherman, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998) . Subsequent to this judgment, they would be asked to describe a concrete entity that is related to the target description (description task). Again, they should first form this description in their mind and press the spacebar once they had done so to then enter this description on the next computer screen. For example, they might first receive a description dealing with how a target person has adjusted to life in Cologne, then be asked to judge how well this person has adjusted on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very well), and finally be asked to describe a concrete advantage of living in Cologne. Again, they were instructed to first think of the critical entity (e.g., advantage of living in Cologne) and to press the spacebar as soon as something had come to their mind. They were further informed that we would assess response latencies for the third task in each trial, so that they should try to provide their answer as fast as possible. For the first two tasks, no response latencies would be assessed so that they could take their time to work on them. To be able to provide their answers as fast as possible for the third task, they should put their right index finger on the spacebar and keep this position throughout the experiment. Finally, participants were given the opportunity to clarify aspects of the experimental procedures. The remainder of the experiment was self-administered.
Participants were first handed a folder that included a procedural priming task similar to the one used in Study 1B. All participants received the same jungle picture used in Study 1B. This time, we added four fine lines of about 1 cm each to the picture to mark the center of each of the four sides. This allowed participants in the experimental group to identify the different halves of the picture. Experimental participants were asked to compare the left and right halves of the jungle scene. Control participants were asked to simply describe the scene.
After completion of this first part of the study, participants proceeded with the second part, which was administered by the computer. Participants worked on a total of three trials that followed the described sequence of impression formation, target judgment, and description task. For each trial, the first screen instructed participants to carefully read the subsequent target description and to form an impression of the described person. The next screen reminded them that response latencies would not be assessed for this impression formation task so that they could take their time. Participants were then exposed to a description of a target person and were asked to form an impression of this person. They were instructed to press the spacebar once they had done so. The next screen again reminded them that response latencies would not be assessed for the subsequent judgment task. Participants were then to judge the target person on a 9-point scale. Again, they were told to press the spacebar as soon as they had formed their judgment. After reporting this judgment on the next screen, they were reminded that for the description task we would assess their response latencies so they should respond as fast as possible. Participants were then instructed to think of an entity that is related to the target description, to press the spacebar as soon as this entity had come to their mind, and to then describe it on the subsequent screen. This exact sequence was repeated for all three trials.
The first two trials were included to obtain a measure of participants' baseline speed of responding. For these trials the description task was unrelated to the self and did thus not assess the accessibility of knowledge about a potential standard subsequent to person judgment. More specifically, in the first trial, participants formed an impression about a person who had moved to Cologne 2 years ago and had mixed feelings about living in a big city. They then judged how much the target person likes living in Cologne and finally described a concrete disadvantage of living in Cologne. In the second trial, participants formed an impression about a smoker who has problems quitting smoking. They then judged how addicted the target person is and then described a concrete disadvantage of smoking. The third trial was the critical one for which the description task pertained to the self. Here, participants first formed an impression of a target person who had engaged in different manual skill tasks (e.g., repairing a bike), they then judged how manually skilled the target person is, and finally described a concrete manual skill that they have themselves. Subsequent to the third trial participants were thanked, debriefed, and given their candy.
In sum, Study 3 is based on a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (standard-related vs. standard-unrelated description) mixed-model design. The first factor was manipulated between participants and the second within participants.
Results
Target judgments. On the basis of the results of the previous studies, we expected participants' judgments about the three target persons not to differ in the comparison priming and the control group. Indeed, there was no indication that priming participants on comparative thinking led to evaluations of the target persons that differed from those of control participants. Both groups judged the respective target persons as similarly happy about living in Cologne (M ϭ 4.28, SD ϭ 1.40 vs. M ϭ 4.52, SD ϭ 1.03; t Ͻ 1), similarly addicted (M ϭ 7.00, SD ϭ 1.02 vs. M ϭ 6.91, SD ϭ 1.49; t Ͻ 1), and similarly manually skilled (M ϭ 7.19, SD ϭ 1.42 vs. M ϭ 7.12, SD ϭ 1.43; t Ͻ 1). Because participants were explicitly instructed to take their time in making these judgments, response latencies could not be analyzed.
Standard descriptions. Our reasoning implies that participants who were procedurally primed to rely more heavily on comparative thinking when judging the target person spontaneously activated more information about the self as a comparison standard than did control participants. As a consequence, experimental participants should be faster in giving descriptions that are standard related (own manual skill) but not in giving standardunrelated descriptions (disadvantages of living in Cologne, disadvantages of smoking).
Again, we excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the question means (4.1% of all responses) from further analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . As a consequence, latencies for critical responses were not available for 6 participants, so the subsequent analysis is based on the responses of 59 participants. Our critical dependent measure is the time participants needed to work on the description task. Response latencies for the two standard-unrelated description tasks (disadvantages of living in Cologne, disadvantages of smoking) were combined into one score by calculating the mean.
The means provided in Figure 2 are clearly consistent with our hypotheses. As expected, participants who were procedurally primed to rely more heavily on comparison when judging the target person were faster in giving the standard-related description (M ϭ 18,743 ms, SD ϭ 8,262) than control participants (M ϭ 25,191 ms, SD ϭ 14,942), t(57) ϭ 2.02, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.53. In contrast, no difference in the time participants took to give the standard-unrelated description emerged (M ϭ 18,169 ms, SD ϭ 8,723 vs. 18,639 ms, SD ϭ 9,250; t Ͻ 1). In a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (standard-related vs. standard-unrelated description) mixed-model ANOVA, this pattern was borne out in a significant interaction effect, F(1, 57) ϭ 3.95, p ϭ .05, partial 2 ϭ .07. In this analysis the main effect of description also reached significance, F(1, 57) ϭ 5.60, p ϭ .02, partial 2 ϭ .09, indicating that participants were faster in giving the standardunrelated than the standard-related descriptions. The main effect of priming did not reach significance, F(1, 57) ϭ 2.14, ns.
Discussion
These findings demonstrate that comparative thinking entails the spontaneous activation of judgment-related information about the comparison standard. Our reasoning holds that this activation contributes to the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking in that judges may use the activated standard information as a proxy for target information that is not available or is difficult to obtain. The activated standard information may thus be used to fill in the blanks of missing target information. Study 4 was designed to examine whether such information transfer is indeed at play during comparative thinking.
Study 4
To do so, we again asked our participants to make judgments about a target City X that was described in terms that made it similar to their hometown. The results of Studies 2 and 3 demonstrate that in this situation, participants who are primed on comparative processing think more about their hometown and activate information about this comparison standard. Our reasoning holds that this activated information about the standard is transferred to the target. If this is indeed the case, then participants primed on comparative thinking should be more likely than control participants to ascribe aspects that characterize the standard to the target. For example, if participants primed on comparative thinking use their hometown of Cologne as a standard when judging target City X, they may ascribe typical aspects of Cologne to City X, even if these aspects were not mentioned in the target description. They may, for example, affirm the possibility that City X has a cathedral, is a center of the media industry, and is located on the banks of a river.
Method
Participants. Fifty-five students at the University of Cologne participated in the study. They were approached in a university cafeteria, asked to take part in a series of unrelated studies, and offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials and procedure. Participants were led to the experimental lab and seated in individual cubicles that each contained a personal computer. The experimenter explained that participants would work on a series of unrelated tasks that were administered together solely to save scarce research resources. Participants were then given a folder that included the procedural priming task that was identical to the one used in Study 1B. Thus one group of the participants (n ϭ 28) was primed on comparative processing, whereas another group (n ϭ 27) worked on the control task.
After completion of the procedural priming task, participants continued with the judgment task, which was administered at the computer. As in Study 2, instructions explained that participants' task was to first form an impression and then to make a series of judgments about an unknown City X. Participants were exposed to the description of City X, which contained a number of aspects that made City X similar and thus comparable to participants' hometown of Cologne, Germany. At the same time, the paragraph also pointed out that City X was a Scandinavian city, thus making it clear that it is not Cologne itself. More specifically, City X was described as a large city that is easy to reach by all means of transportation. It was explained that it is a place with a rich cultural history, is an important destination for tourists, and has a lively music scene. In addition, the description highlighted the fact that the city is known for its large number of festivals. Similar to the procedure of Study 2, after reflecting on the description and thereby forming an impression of City X, participants answered a series of questions about this city. Specifically, they evaluated City X on seven dimensions (number of students, citizens, train stations, post offices, theaters, movie theaters, and Starbucks coffee shops) by giving numeric estimates. For each estimate, the critical question was presented on the computer screen (e.g., "How many university students are there in City X?"). Participants were asked to press the spacebar as soon as they had come up with an estimate and to type in their response on the subsequent screen. We recorded the time that elapsed from the presentation of the question until participants pressed the spacebar to indicate that they had formed an estimate. After participants had given all seven estimates, they were instructed to work on a subsequent "verification" task that was designed to further explore their impression of target City X. The instructions pointed out that this task involved simply guessing whether aspects that are common to some cities are also present in the vaguely described City X. This task involved simple yes-no judgments about 32 aspects of City X. Each aspect was described by a single word, and participants' task was to indicate whether the presented word referred to an aspect that one might find in City X. The stimuli presented in this task were selected on the basis of a pretest regarding their typicality for the city of Cologne. We chose the most typical and the most atypical aspects emerging from this pretest. Sixteen of the presented aspects were very typical of the city of Cologne (e.g., . Each aspect was presented at the center of the computer screen in random order where it remained until participants had indicated whether it characterizes City X by hitting the right ("yes") or left ("no") control key.
After completion of this verification task, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and offered their compensation.
Results
Target judgments. We expected to replicate the results of Study 2 and show that participants who were primed on comparative thinking are faster than control participants in judging City X.
To analyze response latencies for the critical target judgments, we excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the question mean (3.90% of all responses) from further analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) and averaged the remaining latencies into one index (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .69). As expected, participants who were primed on comparative thinking were faster in evaluating City X (M ϭ 6,591 ms, SD ϭ 1,994) than control participants (M ϭ 8,048 ms, SD ϭ 2,484), t(53) ϭ 2.41, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.54.
In addition, we again examined whether participants in both conditions judged target City X differently. To do so, we excluded estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 SDs, z-transformed the individual judgments, and averaged them into one index. Participants' judgments of target City X did not depend on whether they were primed on comparative processing (M ϭ 0.065, SD ϭ 0.62) or not (M ϭ -0.02, SD ϭ 0.55; t Ͻ 1).
Aspect verifications. We hypothesized that participants who were primed on comparative thinking would be more likely to ascribe aspects that characterize the standard Cologne to the target City X. Participants who were primed on comparative thinking should thus be more likely than control participants to accept aspects that are typical of Cologne as characterizing City X. For aspects that are not typical of Cologne, the acceptance rates should not differ for both groups.
To examine this possibility, we first calculated two sum scores: one representing the number of accepted aspects that are related to the standard and one representing the number of accepted aspects that are not related to the standard. As inspection of Figure 3 reveals, the acceptance rates in the verification task were consistent with our expectations. Indeed, participants primed on comparative thinking accepted more Cologne-related stimuli as typical for City X (M ϭ 11.86, SD ϭ 1.74) than did control participants (M ϭ 10.18, SD ϭ 1.39), t(53) ϭ 3.98, p ϭ .001, d ϭ 1.07. No such difference was found for Cologneunrelated aspects (M ϭ 6.53, SD ϭ 2.62 vs. M ϭ 6.56, SD ϭ 2.66; t Ͻ 1). This pattern of means resulted in a significant two-way interaction in a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (standard-related vs. standard-unrelated aspects) mixedmodel ANOVA, F(1, 53) ϭ 4.24, p Ͻ .05, partial 2 ϭ .07. In this analysis, the main effect for the type of aspect was also significant, F(1, 53) ϭ 118.53, p ϭ .001, partial 2 ϭ .69. Overall, participants were more likely to accept standardrelated aspects (M ϭ 11.04, SD ϭ 1.70) than standard-unrelated aspects (M ϭ 6.55, SD ϭ 2.62). In addition, the main effect for priming was significant, F(1, 53) ϭ 3.90, p ϭ .05, partial 2 ϭ .069, suggesting that participants in the comparative thinking condition tended to accept more aspects (M ϭ 9.20, SD ϭ 2.21) than did control participants (M ϭ 8.37, SD ϭ 2.15). 
Discussion
These findings have at least two noteworthy implications. First and foremost, they demonstrate that comparative thinking induces judges to ascribe aspects that characterize the judgmental standard to the judgmental target. In the context of this study, participants who were procedurally primed to engage in more comparative thinking were more likely than control participants to indicate that aspects that are typical of the standard Cologne also characterize the target City X. In line with the present reasoning, this demonstrates that accessible standard information is indeed used as a proxy for target information that is not available. This finding further specifies how comparative thinking shapes information processing. Study 2 demonstrated that participants who are primed on comparative thinking think more about a pertinent standard during target evaluation. Study 3 showed that doing so makes information about the comparison standard accessible. Study 4 suggests that this accessible standard information is indeed transferred to the target.
In addition, the present finding also replicates the judgment facilitation effect first obtained in Study 2. In line with our analysis, we again show that participants primed on comparative thinking are faster in making the critical target judgments than control participants. As in Studies 2 and 3, there is no indication that the judgmental outcomes in both groups differed. This again suggests that comparative thinking holds efficiency advantages. Study 5 was designed to further substantiate this possibility.
Study 5
So far, we have tested for the assumed efficiency advantages of comparative information processing by examining differences in the time judges need to make a critical target judgment. We hypothesized that comparative processing would simplify the judgment process and save cognitive capacity. If this is the case, then participants should be able to make a critical judgment faster if they rely more heavily on comparisons. Studies 2 and 4 demonstrated that this is indeed the case. Furthermore, if comparative processing does indeed save cognitive capacities, then judges who rely more heavily on comparisons in making a target judgment should require less processing capacity to do so. As a consequence, more residual capacity should be available for a secondary task on which judges work in parallel. Just as categorical thinking, for example, frees cognitive capacities for a parallel task (e.g., Macrae et al., 1994) , comparative thinking should free capacities that can then be used for a secondary task. In Study 5, we used a dual-task paradigm (Bargh, 1982; Macrae et al., 1994; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Wickens, 1976) to examine this possibility and to thus shed further light on the potential efficiency advantages of comparative processing. While forming their impression of City X, participants simultaneously monitored a tape-recorded text. If comparative processing does indeed save cognitive resources, then participants who rely more heavily on comparisons when forming an impression of the target should have more residual capacity available to monitor the text. As in previous research using a similar procedure to examine the efficiency advantages of stereotyping (Macrae et al., 1994) , this should allow participants to focus more on the details of the story so that they are subsequently able to reproduce more of these details.
Method
Participants. Fifty-five students took part in the study. They were approached in the university cafeteria and asked to participate in a psychological experiment in exchange for a chocolate bar.
Procedure. Upon agreement, participants were led to a separate room and seated in individual cubicles. Materials and procedures were similar to those used in Studies 1 and 2. Using the same materials as in Studies 1A and 2A, participants were primed to process information in either a more or a less comparative manner. The second part of the study was similar to the judgment task used in Study 2. This part was introduced as an experiment on the effects of mental distraction on a judgment task. Participants were instructed to put on headphones. They first formed an impression of the target City X from the same written description used in Study 2. After forming this impression, the experimenter started the presentation of an audiotaped story, which lasted for a total of about 3 min. The story was about a woman who had trouble with her best friend because of a canary. Participants were instructed to simultaneously monitor the details of this story while judging the target City X on the same dimensions used in Study 2. Participants thus evaluated City X while listening to the tape. After completion of the judgment task, participants were asked to write down as many details from the short story as they could recall.
Results
Target judgments. On the basis of the results of Studies 2 and 4, we again expected participants who were primed on a more comparative processing mode to be faster in judging the target than control participants. To examine this possibility, we again excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the mean (2.9% of all responses). As before, the mean response time for all five judgments on City X was computed for each participant (Cronbach's ␣ ϭ .65). Results were in line with those of Studies 2A and 2B. Participants in the comparative processing condition made the critical judgments faster (M ϭ 6,562 ms, SD ϭ 2,024) than did control participants (M ϭ 8,130 ms, SD ϭ 2,632), t(53) ϭ 2.47, p ϭ .01, d ϭ 0.67. Thus, comparative processing facilitates the critical target judgments even if judges simultaneously work on a second task requiring attentional resources.
Once again, we compared the actual judgments participants made for City X. We excluded estimates that deviated from the question mean by more than 2 SDs, z-transformed the individual judgments, and averaged them into one index. Participants' judgments of target City X did not depend on whether they were primed on comparative processing (M ϭ Ϫ0.11, SD ϭ 0.48) or not (M ϭ 0.12, SD ϭ 0.59), t(53) ϭ 1.59, ns.
Secondary task. The more critical measure in Study 5, however, is participants' performance in the secondary task, namely, the number of remembered details from the short story. If comparative processing saves cognitive resources, then participants in the comparison condition should perform better than those in the control condition. To examine this possibility, we counted the number of correctly reported details for each participant. Consistent with our expectation, participants who were primed on a more comparative processing mode remembered more details (M ϭ 4.96, SD ϭ 0.91) than did control participants (M ϭ 2.79, SD ϭ 0.54), t(52) ϭ 2.09, p ϭ .02, d ϭ 0.55.
5
Discussion
These findings replicate and extend those of Studies 2 and 4 in important ways. First, they again demonstrate that relying more heavily on comparisons allows judges to make a critical target judgment faster. It is notable that this facilitation effect is apparent even if participants concomitantly work on a second task that demands additional processing capacities. Furthermore, Study 5 demonstrates the efficiency advantages of comparative information processing on an entirely novel task. Not only does comparative processing speed up the critical judgment itself, it also frees cognitive capacities that may then be used to work on a secondary task. Because participants could allocate more attentional resources to the short story, they were better able to recall its details. Again, there is no indication that comparative thinking changed the judgmental outcome, suggesting that the increase in efficiency may not come at the cost of a decrease in accuracy.
Study 6
Are there limits to the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking that have been shown in the previous studies? Our reasoning suggests a first potential boundary condition that influences the extent to which these efficiency advantages will be apparent. If comparisons are carried out along an alignable structure that relates individual features of target and standard to one another, then the ease with which such an alignable structure can be established should determine the magnitude of the obtained efficiency advantage. Study 6 was designed to examine this possibility. To do so, we adapted a product choice task that has been developed by Zhang and Markman (2001) . Participants were asked to compare two types of popcorn described by four attributes each and to indicate which one they prefer. For one half of our participants all four attributes were nonalignable in that they concerned different aspects that are relatively independent of one another (e.g., preparation in its own bag vs. tastes somewhat sweet). For the other half, two of the attributes were alignable in that they concerned a similar aspect (e.g., preparation in its own bag vs. preparation in a microwave bowl). For the first group it is difficult to establish an alignable structure and to thus compare both products. For the second group it is easier to establish an alignable structure to compare both products. We hypothesized that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking would be more pronounced if an alignable structure is easier to establish.
Method
Participants. We recruited 55 students at the University of Cologne as participants. They were approached in a university cafeteria, asked to take part in a series of unrelated studies, and offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials. The materials we used for the product choice task were adapted from those designed by Zhang and Markman (2001) . Participants were asked to decide which of two brands of popcorn they prefer. Each brand was characterized by four attributes. Two of these attributes were nonalignable in that they pertained to distinct dimensions for both brands (large kernels vs. slightly low in corn and grain flavor; crunchy for a long time vs. waterproof wrapping). For participants in the nonalignable condition, the remaining attributes were similarly nonalignable and also pertained to distinct dimensions (preparation in its own bag vs. tastes a bit sweet; calories equal to a slice of bread vs. has some citric acid). For participants in the alignable condition, these two remaining attributes were alignable in that they pertained to the same dimension for both brands (preparation in its own bag vs. preparation in microwave bowl; calories equal to a slice of bread vs. calories equal to a tablespoon of sugar). This information was given to participants in the form of a table (see Table 1 ).
Procedures. Upon agreement, participants were led to a separate lab room and seated in individual cubicles equipped with personal computers. The experimenter first explained that participants would work on a series of separate studies that were conducted together to save scarce research resources. Participants were instructed to first work through the materials in a folder that was located in front of them. This folder included the procedural priming task, which was identical to the one used in Study 3. Thus, all participants were again exposed to the picture of the jungle scene. A first group of participants (n ϭ 27) was asked to compare the left and right halves of the picture and to write down all the similarities and differences they could find. Control participants (n ϭ 28) were asked to describe the picture.
Upon completion of the procedural priming task, participants were told to proceed with the next task, which was computer administered. Instructions pointed out that this study was concerned with product evaluations. More specifically, participants received the following instructions:
Imagine you would like to buy microwave popcorn. In the store you have the choice between two brands. Please form an impression of both brands on the basis of the information you will receive. We will ask you a few questions about these popcorns. To answer "Popcorn A" please press the button marked with a blue sticker with your left index finger. To answer "Popcorn B" please press the button marked with a yellow sticker with your right index finger. Please put your index fingers on the respective keys.
Before being exposed to the product information, participants worked on four practice trials that were included to familiarize them with the response procedure. To practice, participants were asked to answer "Popcorn A" and "Popcorn B" twice each. At the end of the four practice trials, participants were informed that they would now be given the critical information about the brands of popcorn. They were reminded to put their index fingers on the respective keys and to proceed to the next screen by pressing the spacebar.
This screen contained the information about the two brands of popcorn, presented in a table (see Table 1 ). The critical question, "Which popcorn would you prefer?" was presented on the top of the screen, and the choice options "Popcorn A" and "Popcorn B" were presented on the left and right sides of the bottom of the screen, respectively. This information remained on the screen until participants made their choice. We recorded participants' processing time from the presentation of the product information until they indicated their choice.
Subsequently, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and offered their compensation.
Results
The present analysis holds that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are more pronounced if an alignable structure between the choice alternatives is easier to establish. This should be the case if at least some of their attributes are alignable because they pertain to the same dimension. In this situation, participants primed on comparative thinking should be faster in making their choice than control participants. If the choice alternatives are characterized only by attributes that pertain to distinct dimensions, then the alignable structure along which the comparison is carried out is difficult to establish, so the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking may fade. In this situation, participants primed on comparative thinking should not be faster in making their choice than control participants.
Again, we excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the question means (1.9% of all responses) from further analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . As a consequence, latencies for critical responses were not available for 1 participant, and thus the analysis of response latencies was conducted on 54 participants.
The mean response latencies for participants' choice, depicted in Figure 4 , are consistent with our reasoning. As expected, when the provided information was at least partly alignable, participants who were primed on comparative processing chose between the brands of popcorn more quickly (M ϭ 16,687 ms, SD ϭ 5,566) than did control participants (M ϭ 20,803 ms, SD ϭ 5,250), t(50) ϭ 1.81, p ϭ .04, d ϭ 0.49. When the provided information was not alignable, however, participants primed on comparative thinking were not faster in making their choice (M ϭ 20,639 ms, SD ϭ 7,281) than control participants (M ϭ 17,475 ms, SD ϭ 5,413), t(50) ϭ 1.39, ns. This pattern produced a significant interaction effect in a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (high vs. low alignability) between-subjects ANOVA using participants' choice latencies as the dependent measure, F(1, 50) ϭ 5.10, p ϭ .03, partial 2 ϭ .09. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects reached significance (all Fs Ͻ 1).
It is notable that participants' choices between Popcorn A and Popcorn B were not significantly influenced by our experimental manipulations. In a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (high vs. low alignability) between-subjects ANOVA using participants' choices as the dependent measure, neither the main effect of alignability (F Ͻ 1) nor the main effect of priming, F(1, 51) ϭ 2.09, p ϭ .15, nor the interaction (F Ͻ 1) reached significance.
Discussion
These findings have at least two notable implications. For one, they establish a first boundary condition of the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. Participants who were primed on comparative processing were faster to choose which popcorn they preferred only if the features of both products were at least partly alignable. Furthermore, these findings indirectly support the notion that comparisons are carried out along alignable structures that interconnect features of target and standard and thus echo the implications of a large body of evidence (for an overview, see e.g., Gentner & Markman, 1997) . If structural alignment is impeded so that comparisons are more difficult to carry out, then the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking fade. In this respect, structural alignment appears to contribute to the efficiency of comparative thinking.
Study 7
We designed our last study to examine a second potential boundary condition, namely, the evaluability of attributes. It has been suggested that attributes differ in the extent to which they can be evaluated in isolation versus require a comparison (Hsee, 1996) . Whether a house that one considers buying does or does not have a garden, for example, can be easily evaluated without comparing it to other houses. Whether the price for the house is reasonable, however, depends on a complex array of additional factors (e.g., location, market prices in the area) and is thus difficult to evaluate without comparing it to alternatives. We hypothesized that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are primarily apparent in choice situations that involve attributes that are difficult to evaluate independently. To examine this possibility, we adapted Waterproof wrapping Calories equal to a slice of bread Calories equal to tablespoon of sugar a product choice task that has been developed by Hsee (1996) . Participants were asked to compare two CD changers and choose which one they prefer. Both products were described with respect to four characteristics. One half of our participants was given background information about these characteristics so that they were in a position to evaluate each product independently (high evaluability). The second half was not given this background information and could evaluate only the implications of some of the characteristics by comparing both products (low evaluability). We expected the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking to be primarily apparent under conditions of low evaluability.
Method
Participants. We recruited 110 University of Cologne students as participants. They were asked to take part in a series of unrelated studies and offered a chocolate bar as compensation.
Materials. The materials we used for the product choice task were adapted from those introduced by Hsee (1996, Study 4) . Participants were asked to decide which of two CD changers they would prefer and were given the information provided in Table 2 . The CD changers were characterized along four dimensions. Two of those (brand, CD capacity) were high in evaluability in that their implications could easily be evaluated in isolation, without a comparison with an alternative. The remaining two (total harmonic distortion [THD] , warranty) were low in evaluability in that their implications could hardly be evaluated in isolation, unless additional information about their meaning was provided. This additional information was given to participants in the high evaluability condition. Specifically, these participants were informed that "for most products on the market THD ranges from 0.002% (best) to 0.012% (worst)" and that "information on warranty was given in months." This additional information allowed participants to evaluate these attributes for each of the choice options without comparing it to the alternative. Thus, participants in the high evaluability condition were able to evaluate each of the given dimensions without comparison. Participants in the low evaluability condition were able to evaluate half of the given dimensions without comparison.
Procedures. Upon agreement, participants were led to a separate lab room and seated in individual cubicles equipped with personal computers. The experimenter first explained that participants were about to work on a series of separate studies that were conducted together solely to save scarce research resources. Participants were instructed to first work through the materials in a folder that was located in front of them. This folder included the procedural priming task, which was identical to the one used in Study 3. Thus, again all participants were exposed to the picture of the jungle scene. One group of the participants (n ϭ 56) was asked to compare the left and right halves of the picture and to write down all the similarities and differences they could find. Control participants (n ϭ 54) were asked to describe the picture.
Upon completion of the procedural priming task, participants were told to proceed with the next task, which was computer administered. The materials and procedures of this task closely followed those of Hsee (1996) . Instructions explained that this study was concerned with product evaluations. Participants were asked to imagine the following scenario:
You have decided to buy a CD changer. In the store, you have to realize that the shop assistant is unable to provide you with information about the products that goes beyond what is provided in the brief product description. Your choice has narrowed down to two products and you have some information available to help you with your decision.
Participants in the low evaluability condition were further informed that in the provided information THD stands for total harmonic distortion, for which a low value indicates better sound quality. Participants in the high evaluability condition received the same information and were additionally informed that for most products on the market THD ranges from 0.002% (best) to 0.012% (worst). These participants were further informed that the warranty was given in months.
Before being exposed to the product information, participants worked on four practice trials that were included to familiarize them with providing answers using the computer keyboard. Instructions to these practice trials first informed participants that we would ask them a number of questions about the CD changers. To answer "CD Changer A" they should press the key marked with a blue sticker with their left index finger. To answer "CD Changer B," they should press the key marked with a yellow sticker with their right index finger. Participants were told to keep their index fingers on the respective keys throughout the task. To practice, participants were asked to answer "CD Changer A" and "CD Changer B" twice each. At the end of the four practice trials, participants were informed that they would now be given the critical information about the CD changers and asked to evaluate them. They were reminded to put their index fingers on the respective keys and to proceed to the next screen by pressing the spacebar.
This screen contained the information about the two CD changers, which was presented in a table similar to Table 2 . The critical question, "Which CD changer would you prefer?" was presented at the top of the screen, and the choice options "CD Changer A" and "CD Changer B" were presented on the left and right sides of the bottom of the screen, respectively. This information remained on the screen until participants had made their choice. We recorded participants' processing time from the presentation of the product information until they indicated their choice.
Subsequently, participants were thanked for their participation, debriefed, and offered their compensation. Note. THD ϭ total harmonic distortion. Participants in the high evaluability condition were also informed that low values for THD indicate better sound quality (typical range ϭ 0.002% to 0.012%) and that the warranty was given in months.
Results and Discussion
Our reasoning suggests that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are primarily apparent if the choice alternatives are difficult to evaluate independently, because at least some of their attributes are low in evaluability. In this situation, judges have to compare the choice alternatives to give meaning to the otherwise meaningless information. This comparison should be easier to carry out by participants who have been procedurally primed to engage in comparative thinking, so that they should be faster in making their choice than control participants. If the choice alternatives are easy to evaluate independently because all of the attributes are high in evaluability, however, no such comparison is necessary to make an informed choice. Here, priming participants on comparative thinking does not hold a processing advantage. In this situation, participants primed on comparative thinking should be as fast in making their choice as control participants.
As in the previous studies, we first excluded response times that differed by more than 2 SDs from the question means (1.9% of all responses) from further analysis (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) . As a consequence, latencies for critical responses were not available for 4 participants, such that the analysis of response latencies was conducted on 106 participants.
The mean response latencies for participants' choice, depicted in Figure 5 , are consistent with this reasoning. As expected, when the provided information was low in evaluability participants who were primed on comparative processing made faster choices between the CD changers (M ϭ 10.978 ms, SD ϭ 3,143) than did control participants (M ϭ 14,423 ms, SD ϭ 4,544), t(102) ϭ 2.50, p ϭ .01, d ϭ 0.48. When the provided information was high in evaluability, however, this was not the case (M ϭ 13,159 ms, SD ϭ 5,952 vs. M ϭ 12,686 ms, SD ϭ 5,480; t Ͻ 1). This pattern produced a significant interaction effect in a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (high vs. low evaluability) between-subjects ANOVA using participants' choice latencies as the dependent measure, F(1, 102) ϭ 4.20, p ϭ .04, partial 2 ϭ .04. In this analysis, none of the remaining effects reached significance: F Ͻ 1, for the main effect of evaluability; F(1, 102) ϭ 2.40, p ϭ .12, for the main effect of priming.
It is notable that participants' choices between CD Changer A and CD Changer B were not significantly influenced by our experimental manipulations. In a 2 (comparison vs. control priming) ϫ 2 (high vs. low evaluability) between-subjects ANOVA using participants' choices as a dependent measure neither the main effect of priming (F Ͻ 1) nor the main effect of evaluability, F(1, 106) ϭ 1.74, p ϭ .19, nor the interaction (F Ͻ 1) reached significance. This finding is consistent with Hsee (1996) , who demonstrated that a similar evaluability manipulation influenced participants' choices only if both choice options were presented separately, not if they were presented jointly as was the case in the present study.
These results thus establish a second boundary condition for the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. Comparative thinking allows judges to make choices more rapidly if the choice options are at least partly characterized by attributes that are low in evaluability.
General Discussion
The present research has examined efficiency advantages of comparative information processing. The results of seven studies demonstrate the efficiency of comparative thinking, shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to it, and establish boundary conditions for its occurrence. Studies 1-4 demonstrate that comparative thinking changes information processing. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that judges who are procedurally primed to process information in a more comparative manner searched for less information about the judgmental target than did control participants. Comparative thinking thus induces judges to limit the search for target knowledge. Studies 2 and 3 further show that comparative processing induces judges to think more about an information-rich comparison standard about which they activate judgment-relevant information. Study 4 further suggests that this activated standard knowledge may be used as a proxy for target information that is unavailable or difficult to obtain. These changes in information processing entail efficiency advantages for comparative thinking. In line with this notion, Studies 2, 4, and 5 demonstrate that participants who were procedurally primed to process information in a more comparative manner were more efficient (i.e., faster) in making the critical target judgment. Furthermore, Study 5 shows that participants who rely more heavily on comparative processing require fewer cognitive capacities to solve the critical judgment task. These efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are particularly likely to occur if (a) the judgmental target and a pertinent standard are characterized by alignable features so that a shared alignable structure between target and standard is easy to establish (Study 6) and if (b) the features of target and standard are low in evaluability in that they are difficult to evaluate in isolation (Study 7).
The present research has demonstrated these efficiency advantages of comparative thinking using a variety of different materials. First, we used two different methods to induce more comparative information processing. In most studies, we directly induced a more or less comparative processing style with the help of a procedural priming task in which participants were explicitly instructed to either compare two pictures with one another or to describe them separately. Study 2B used a more indirect method. Here, participants were primed on a more or less comparative processing style by engaging in one of two alternative error search tasks. Participants had to either repeatedly compare a target picture to a standard to find a set of errors or they had to closely inspect the target in isolation to find the same errors. Second, we used four different types of judgmental targets. Specifically, participants judged either specific aspects of a target city or a target apartment or made choices between different kinds of popcorn or different CD changers. Third, we used two different measures for the assumed efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. In most studies, we examined how fast participants were in making a set of judgments. In addition, we used a dual-task paradigm to demonstrate that comparative thinking not only allows participants to make judgments faster but that at the same time it requires less cognitive capacity. As in research examining efficiency advantages in other domains (Macrae et al., 1994) , this is apparent in improved performance in a secondary task. The variety of different methods we have applied speak to the generalizability of the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking.
Limits of Efficiency Advantages
The presented research has demonstrated not only that comparative thinking has efficiency advantages; it has also established two boundary conditions. Specifically, comparative thinking appears to allow judges to make their judgments more quickly only if target and standard share alignable features and if they are evaluated along dimensions that are difficult to evaluate in isolation. This raises the question of how ubiquitous the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking really are. In this respect, it is important to note that the conditions under which comparative thinking proved to be more efficient are likely to be in place under most circumstances. In Studies 6 and 7, participants were directly provided with comparison standards that were or were not characterized by nonalignable and evaluable features. Outside of the psychological laboratory, however, such direct presentation of standards that are characterized by a limited set of features that are explicitly designed to be evaluable and nonalignable is unlikely to exist. First, in many situations, judges are not directly provided with a comparison standard but instead activate this standard themselves. Such mechanisms of standard selection are often driven by structural alignment (e.g., Mussweiler & Gentner, 2007) , so that judges are likely to activate a standard that shares an alignable structure with the target so that alignable features exist. Under these conditions, as Study 6 demonstrates, comparative thinking holds the described efficiency advantages. Second, targets and standards that are encountered outside of the psychological laboratory are typically more complex than the stimuli used in Studies 6 and 7 in that they are not characterized by a mere four features, but by a larger-oftentimes seemingly indefinitenumber of features. The more features exist, the smaller the likelihood that all of them will be evaluable and nonalignable. Most naturally occurring standards will be characterized by a mix of alignable and nonalignable, evaluable and nonevaluable features. Studies 6 and 7 demonstrate that if a subset of target and standard features was alignable and nonevaluable then comparative thinking holds efficiency advantages. What is more, with respect to alignability, if alignable and nonalignable features exist, then judges typically focus on the alignable ones (Gentner & Markman, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1996) . Together, this suggests that the boundary conditions we have established in Studies 6 and 7 are more the exception than the rule, so that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking are likely to be fairly ubiquitous.
Accuracy of Comparative Thinking
We have suggested that oftentimes comparative thinking is more efficient without necessarily being less accurate. Clearly, the mechanisms of information focus and information transfer may in principle influence the judgmental outcome. However, we contend that they often do not. More specifically, information focus is unlikely to influence judgmental outcomes if the implications of the information that judges do and do not focus on during comparative thinking are similar. In addition, information transfer is unlikely to influence judgment if the implications of the transferred standard information fit the target. The latter may often be the case, because judges typically activate standards that are similar to the target. Consistent with our hypothesis, the present findings do not give any indication that comparative thinking reduces judgment accuracy. To be sure, we could not assess accuracy directly, because the critical judgments pertained to fictitious targets for which no true values existed. Differences in judgment accuracy, however, presuppose that the judgments of participants who relied more versus less on comparative thinking differ. This does not seem to be the case, as across the present studies no systematic differences between the judgments made by both groups appear to exist. Of course, given the typical ambiguities associated with the interpretation of null effects, one has to use caution in drawing firm conclusions from this evidence. Future research will have to examine how comparative thinking influences judgment accuracy more closely.
Nevertheless, at first sight these findings seem to be at odds with a substantial body of evidence that demonstrates that comparisons influence judgmental outcomes. Research on judgmental anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) , for example, has demonstrated that numeric estimates depend critically on the comparison standards that judges are exposed to (for reviews, see Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a) . Similarly, social comparison research has demonstrated that self-evaluations depend on the social comparison standards to which judges are exposed (for a review, see Mussweiler, 2003) .
How do these findings go together with the present research? We suspect that the critical difference between both sets of evidence is the mode of standard activation. In anchoring and social comparison research, judges are typically confronted with a judgmental standard that is explicitly provided for comparison (e.g., "Is the percentage of African nations in the United Nations higher or lower than 65%?" "Are you more or less athletic than Bill Clinton?") or is made accessible (e.g., via subliminal priming; Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Mussweiler et al., 2004a) . Furthermore, these standards are typically selected to be different from the judgmental target. In the present studies showing that comparative thinking increases judgment efficiency without leading to differences in judgment, this is not the case. Judges are not externally provided with a standard, but rather, they activate the standards themselves. Because standard activation is typically led by targetstandard similarity (Festinger, 1954; Kahneman & Miller, 1986) , judges in the present research are likely to use standards that are similar to the target rather than the dissimilar standards that are typically provided. This difference in how similar the used comparison standard is to the judgmental target may be responsible for the differential effects on the judgmental outcome.
Normative and Efficiency Aspects of Comparison
The present perspective on comparison processes supplements more classic perspectives that have primarily focused on normative aspects of comparative thinking. This normative focus is particularly apparent in traditional views of social comparison processes (Festinger, 1954) . Five decades of research have demonstrated how strongly people rely on comparisons with others when evaluating themselves. How people see themselves thus critically depends on how they compare with others. Following Festinger's (1954) original proposal, social comparison research has traditionally focused on the normative foundations of social comparison processes. In particular, the fundamental assumption has long been that people engage in social comparisons to obtain the most diagnostic information for self-evaluation (see Buunk & Gibbons, 2007 , for a recent review). Supplementing this traditional view, more recent evidence suggests that comparisons do not exclusively follow this diagnosticity criterion. In fact, as we have pointed out before, judges even engage in comparisons that are unlikely to provide them with diagnostic information about their own performances and characteristics. Comparing one's own performance with that of a standard who has previously received extra training is unlikely to help evaluate one's own abilities. Still, people spontaneously compare with such nondiagnostic standards (Gilbert et al., 1995) . Similarly, the athletic abilities of a professional athlete such as Michael Jordan hold little valuable information about one's own abilities. Still, people spontaneously use this standard for comparison (Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004b) , even if he was presented outside of their awareness (Mussweiler et al., 2004a) . Whereas such findings are difficult to reconcile with the notion that comparisons are carried out to obtain diagnostic information about the target, they are consistent with a perspective that focuses on the efficiency advantages of comparative processing. Judges may engage in comparisons with irrelevant standards because doing so allows them to make judgments in a quick and efficient manner. Oftentimes, comparisons may thus not be primarily engaged to obtain diagnostic target knowledge but to save cognitive resources in the target-evaluation process.
Future Directions
The present conceptualization has a number of implications that may be fruitfully explored in future research. For one, a structural alignment perspective suggests further boundary conditions that may boost or mitigate the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. First, it has been suggested that judges' ability to establish an alignable structure depends on how much background knowledge they have in the target domain (Gentner & Rattermann, 1991) . For example, experts are more likely than novices to transfer solutions between structurally similar math problems (Novick, 1988) . If comparative thinking unfolds along alignable structures, then this suggests that the more background knowledge and expertise judges have, the more they may profit from the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. In fact, the efficiency of comparative thinking may be a driving force behind the efficiency of expert judgment. Second, it has been demonstrated that time pressure limits judges' ability to establish alignable structures (e.g., Goldstone & Medin, 1994) . To the extent that establishing such an alignable structure is a precondition for comparative thinking, this suggests that judges with limited processing resources may be less likely to engage in comparison. The efficiency advantages of comparative thinking may be less likely to become apparent when they are most needed.
Furthermore, future research may supplement the present studies by scrutinizing purely procedural efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. We have proposed that the mechanisms of information focus and information transfer contribute to the obtained efficiency advantages. Both of these mechanisms are information based, in that they focus on what information about target and standard is activated and how this information may be used to make comparative thinking more efficient. The present research demonstrates that these information-based mechanisms are indeed at play during comparative thinking. More specifically, Studies 1A and 1B show that comparative thinking leads judges to search for less information about the judgmental target. Furthermore, in combination Studies 2A and 3 demonstrate that comparative thinking involves the spontaneous activation of information about a pertinent standard. Study 4 further shows that this activated information is transferred to the judgmental target. These mechanisms of information focus and information transfer are likely to contribute to the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking. In addition to these information-based mechanisms, information-free mechanisms that operate without the activation and use of specific information about the target and the standard may also be at play during comparative thinking. Future research will have to identify whether information-free mechanisms contribute to the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking and how they interact with the information-based mechanisms that were identified in the present research.
In addition, our reasoning raises the question of how comparative thinking influences satisfaction. We have suggested that comparative thinking allows judges to make judgments and choices more quickly, oftentimes without obtaining worse outcomes. But are judges who rely more on comparative thinking also as happy with the judgment or choice they have made as judges who rely less on comparison? So far, we have not examined how comparative thinking influences satisfaction. Research on choice overload (e.g., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002) , however, suggests that particularly in situations in which people are overwhelmed by their choice options, comparative thinking may reduce judges' satisfaction with their outcome. Too many options in a choice situation lead to decreased satisfaction with the actual outcome (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2002) . This is particularly the case for judges who try to make the best possible choice (Schwartz et al., 2002) . It is notable that this latter tendency is related to judges' reliance on social comparisons, which suggests that judges who try to make the best possible choice rely more heavily on comparative thinking in general. In this respect, these findings are a first, admittedly indirect, hint that comparative thinking may at times lead judges to be less satisfied with their choice. Future research will have to examine how comparative thinking influences satisfaction more directly.
It is also interesting that the cognitive and affective consequences of not being satisfied-counterfactual thoughts and the experience of regret-are also closely linked to comparison processes, namely, between the actual and an alternative outcome (see Roese, 2008, and Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007 , for recent reviews). The effects of comparative information processing can therefore be expected to go far beyond the efficiency of information processing, judgment, and choice. Instead, it seems natural to assume that judges' evaluations of their judgment, decision, and choice outcomes will also be shaped by comparative thinking.
Conclusion
We speculate that the efficiency advantages of comparative thinking may be one reason for the apparent ubiquity of comparisons in human information processing. No matter whether people perceive, process, and evaluate information about simple physical objects or complex social stimuli, they rely on comparisons with a pertinent norm or standard (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) . In fact, this leaning toward comparative thinking is so strong that judges even make use of irrelevant and misleading standards. In light of the present findings, comparisons may play such a pivotal role because they allow judges to obtain an efficiency-enhancing informational focus in processing target information. Comparisons are thus-above all-relatively fast.
